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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- -

--

- -

----

SALT
CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.

ROBERT RAY DAVISON,
Defendant and Respondent.

- - -- - - - - - - - - - -

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NATURE OF THE CASE
Robert Ray Davison, who was unrepresented by
counsel, was convicted in the City Court of Salt Lake
City of using foul and abusive language in violation of
§ 32-1-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965.

Upon appeal to the Third Judicial District

Court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding,
§ 32-1-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
1965, was declared to be ultra vires the City's
authority and beyond the scope of the authorizing
statute§ 10-8-50, U.C.A., 1953.

The basis for the

District Court holding was not that the City lacked
authority to pass an ordinance but simply that the
City Commission lacks municipal authority to pass

such a TTsweeping ordinance. 11
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent submits that the decision
of the District Court should be affirmed and the
ordinance declared inoperative as exceeding legislative
authorization.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 6, 1970, the defendant, Robert Ray
Davison, was arrested pursuant to

§

32-1-1, Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, i.e.
allegedly using foul and abusive language.

On the

day in question the arresting officer was summoned
by a report that a fight was in progress at 50 South
8th West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
when the officer arrived.

The fight was ewer

The officer requested to

see the defendant's identification.

The defendant

replied that he did not have to identify himself unless
he was under arrest.

The officer responded grabbing

defendant's arm and pushing and shoving him and telling
the defendant he had better cooperate or he would end
up in jail, whereupon defendant stated:
of you mother-fuckers bothering me. TT
-2-
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(The city

defendant stated, "I don't have to show you motherfuckers anything.")

The defendant was then placed

under arrest for allegedly violating

§

32-1-1, Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 32-1-1 REGARDING
FCXIL AND ABUSIVE LANGUAGE IS ULTRA VIRES
AND EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE
AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION.
It is a well settled principle of law that cities
have no inherent legislative power and can exercise
only those powers specifically delegated to them by
the State Legislature.

Section 10-8-50 of the Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 sets forth the powers and duties
of all cities.

It provides as follows:

They may provide for the punishment
of persons disturbing the peace and
the good order of the city, or any
lawful assembly, by clamor or noise,
by intoxication, fighting or using
obscene or profane language, by indecent or disorderly conduct, or by
lewd or lascivious behavior or otherwise; and may punish for interference
with any city officer in the discharge
of his duty. They may provide for the
punishment of trespass and such other
petty offenses as the board of commissioners or city council may deem proper."
-3-

On the basis of the foregoing authority the
city enacted

§ 32-1-1,

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake

City, Utah, 1965 which provides:
"It should be unlawful for any person
to use abusive, menacing, insulting,
or slanderous or profane language
within the limits of Salt Lake City. TT
At this juncture, it is critically significant and
important to understand what Judge Bryant H. Croft
held with regard to the ordinance in question.

Quoting

from pages 1 and 2 of his opinion, Judge Croft makes
the follCMing statement:
"The provision of Section 10-8-50 of
the Utah Code 1953 as amended, which
spells out the powers and duties of
all cities, the State legislature has
provided that cities may provide for
the punishment of persons disturbing
the peace and the good order of the city
or any lawful assembly by, among other
things, lewd or rather, by using obscene
or profane language, and may punish for
interference with any officer in the
discharge of his duty. It is my opinion
that the city's pCMer to pass ordinances
is spelled out in Title 10, Chapter 8
of the Utah Code and Section 50 does not
authorize the city to make it a violation
of law merely to use obscene or profane
language; that the legislation authorizes
the city to pass ordinances providing
for the punishment of persons disturbing
the peace in various ways, one of which
is through the use of obscene and profane
language. TT
-4-
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Judge Croft continues on page 2:
"I think the City ordinance to be valid
under the provisions of the state statute
must make it unlawful for any person to
disturb the peace by use of this language;
and my thinking there, of course, is the
way the ordinance now use anybody's use
of language under any circumstances might
be described as obscene irrespective of
whether a disturbance of the peace was
involvea or any other disturbance of the
corrmunity peace and quiet, is going
further than the City Corrmission is
authorized to go, and, therefore, I find
that Ordinance 32-1-1 exceeds the authority
granted to the cities by the legislature
(Emphasis added)
It is obvious from the foregoing that Judge
Croft's holding was not to the effect that cities
lack the authority to enact foul and abusive language
ordinances, as the city contends, or that he ruled
the City ordinance unconstitutional, on its face but
rather the city in enacting Section 32-1-1, with its
broad sweeping language, had enacted an ultra vires
ordinance beyond legislative sanction.

Respondent

respectfully submits that the argument advanced by
the appellant regarding the reading of Judge Croft's
opinion as declaring the ordinance unconstitutional
is not in consonant with the holding of the District
Court.
In arriving at his decision Judge Croft was
-5-

utilizing the "Dillon Rule" which has been quoted
with approval in this jurisdiction.

See Salt Lake

City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P.234 (1923); Logan
City v. Buck, 3 Utah 301, 2 P. 706 (1883); Salt Lake
City v. Revene,

101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942);

Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc.,
P.2d 773 (1944).

106 Utah 517, 150

In Nance, Chief Justice Wolfe

summarized Dillon's rule as follows:
To determine whether or not a city has
power to enact any particular ordinance
the court must look to the legislative
grant of power and to the Constitution
of the State of Utah. If there is a
reasonable doubt concerning the existence
of a particular power, that doubt should
be resolved against the city and the power
should be denied. 106 Utah at 519, 150
P.2d at 775 (1944). (Emphasis added)
Certainly, the Utah legislature could not have intended
such a

legally suspect result as making it unlawful,

under all circumstances, to utter foul or abusive
language within the limits of Salt Lake City, as
Section 32-1-1 apparently allows.

In restricting a

city's authority to instances where a breach of the
peace ensues, Judge Croft as well as the Utah
legislature was undoubtedly mindful of the Constitutional limitation of overbreadth in speech cases.
-6-
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The case of Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938
(N.D. Ill. 1968) summarizes well the conceptual
framework regarding considerations of overbreadth:
The concept of overbreadth * * * rests
on principles of substantive due process
which forbid the prohibition of certain
individual freedoms. The primary issue
is not reasonable notice or adequate
standards, although these issues may be
involved. Rather the issue is whether
the language of the statute, given its
normal meaning is so broad that its
sanctions may apply to conduct protected
by the Constitution. Frequently, the
resolution of this issue depends upon
whether the statute permits police and
other officials to wield unlimited
discretionar powers in its enforcement.
If the scope o the power permitted these
officials is so broad that the exercise
of constitutionally protected conduct
depends upon their own subjective views
as to the propriety of the conduct, the
statute is unconstitutional. (Emphasis
added). Id. at 951-952.
Thus, there are two elements to consider in evaluating
overbreadth -- whether or not, under the language of
the statute, constitutionally protected speech or
assembly are made criminal and whether or not the
statute gives police unlimited discretion.

Section

32-1-1 which prohibits any person from using abusive,
menacing, insulting or slanderous or profane language
within the limits of Salt Lake City, raises serious
questions regarding infringement of constitutionally
-7-
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protected speech as the Cohen case, discussed in the
following paragraph indicates.

It is also obvious

from the language of the ordinance that police
officers have unlimited discretion in enforcing the
ordinance due to the subjective nature of evaluating
the utterances.

Judge Croft was fully aware of the

foregoing limitations in holding that Section 10-8-50
authorizes punishment of persons disturbing the peace
in various ways, one of which is through the use of
obscene or profane language.

Judge Croft's holding

was the only way to insure that the city would not
go beyond the parameters of constitutional law.

The

District Court opinion,declaring the ordinance ultra
vires, was the only way to save the City's power which
otherwise would be extremely suspect from the standpoint of federal constitutional law.
Regarding the possible infringement of constitutionally protected speech and the contention raised
by the city that any language which is profane,
abusive, menacing, insulting or slanderous is language
which by itself, and without any other actions, a
breach of the peace, it becomes necessary to analyze
the recent case of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
39 L.W. 4713 (1971).

Cohen was convicted of violating

2

'

Section 415 of the California Penal Code which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person

*

***

by

offensive conduct," for wearing in a corridor

of the Los Angeles Courthouse a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft".

The Supreme Court held that

absent a more particularized and compelling reason
for its actions, the state may not, consistently with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple
display of this four-letter expletive a criminal
offense.

The court noted that there was no showing

that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently
aroused or that appellant intended such a result.
The same can be said for the respondent in the case
at bar.
In further clarifying its ruling, the court
stated:
Given the subtlety and complexity of
the factors involved, if Cohen's
'speech' was otherwise entitled to
constitutional protection, we do not
think the fact that some unwilling
'listeners' in a public building may
have been briefly exposed to it can
serve to justify this breach of the
peace conviction were, as here, there
was no evidence that persons powerless
to avoid appellant's conduct did in fact
object to it, and where that portion
of the statute upon which Cohen's
-9-

conviction evinces no concern * * *
with the special plight of the' captive
auditor, but instead indiscriminately
sweeps within its prohibitions all
Toffensive conductT that disturbs any
neighborhood or person'. Id. at 22.
The ordinance in question, Section 32-1-1 makes no
such distinction and would seem to fall victim to
this constitutional objection if Judge Croft's opinion ,2
is ignored.

Indeed, as the court states:

In fact, words are often chosen
as much for their emotive as
their cognitive value. Id. at 26
By way of further illustration regarding potential
problems encountered in tying breach of the peace to
foul and abusive language, it is useful to look at
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-238,
L. ed. 2d 697, 702-703, 83 S. Ct. 680 (1963) and
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552, 13 L.ed 2d
471, 482, 85 S. Ct. 453 (1965).

In Edwards, the

South Carolina court permitted criminal conviction
for breach of the peace if the speech, "stirred
people to anger, invited public dispute or brought
about a condition of unrest."

372 U.S. at 238, 9

L. Ed 2d at 703, 83 S. Ct. at 686.

The Cox case

defined breach of the peace as "to agitate, to arouse
from a state of repose to molest, to interrupt, to
-10-

hinder or disquiet."

379 U.S. at 551, 13 L. ed 2d

at 482, 85 S. Ct. at 465.

In both cases, the con-

victions were reversed because of the imprecise
definition of the offense and the infringement on
the constitutional rights of free speech and assembly.
These decisions recognize the wide open standard of
responsibility where the offense is predicated on conduc
calculated to create disturbances of the peace.

Instead

of involving an appraisal of the comments per se, it
involves calculations as to the boiling point of a
particular person or group.

This kind of criminal

libel "makes a man a criminal simply because his
neighbors have no self control and cannot refrain from
violence."
151 (1954).

Chafee, Free Speech in the United States,
Consequently, Judge Croft's reasoning was

the only possible construction that would be free from
constitutional infirmity.

Cf. State v. Musser, 110

Utah 534, 175 P.2d 725 (1947).
CONCWSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court be affirmed and
that Section 32-1-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake

-11-
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City, Utah, 1965 be declared invalid as exceeding
legislative authorization.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Attorney for Respondent
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